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Abstract: This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple
mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the
multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric informa-
tion and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogenous countries
are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must
prevent two sorts of free-riding problems - free riding in effort provision
and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultane-
ously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options
that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the
provision of incentives to participate.With such mechanism, all countries vol-
untary contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the
most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its “business as
usual” level.
Keywords: Free-riding, environmental agreements, asymmetric informa-
tion, mechanism design.
1 Introduction
Over the past twenty years, the long run consequences of human activities on environ-
mental fundamentals and more specifically the anthropogenic origin of global warm-
ing have been a cause of raising concern. That period has seen flourish worrying re-
ports which have repeatedly insisted not only on the environmental urgency to reach
a worldwide agreement in controlling emissions, but also on the irreversible costs of
not doing so.1 Nevertheless, very little advances have been encountered in persuading
∗We thank participants at the Congress of the Canadian Economic Association in Calgary where this
paper was presented as a State of the Art Lecture. All errors are ours.
†Paris School of Economics-EHESS. Email: david.martimort@parisschoolofeconomics.eu
‡Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-IDEI). Email: wsandz@tse-fr.eu
1See the Stern Review (2006).
the most polluting countries to enter into binding agreements that would push them
to credibly reduce their emissions. The objective of this paper is to offer an economists’
look at this major issue, highlight the fundamental difficulties in reaching such agree-
ments and propose a simple mechanism that might help under some circumstances.
For economists, pollution is often refereed to as the prime textbook example of
multilateral externalities. In the case of global warming of interest for this paper, each
country may indeed benefit from not reducing its own emissions while at the same
time it certainly suffers from the insufficient global level of emissions reached with
those individual efforts. Environmental economics textbooks are full of solutions to
reach efficiency in such contexts, either by means of markets, quotas, taxes or subsi-
dies, under various circumstances. Yet, this body of works which brings rather opti-
mistic news stands in sharp contrast with the difficulties to enforce an agreement on
a particular mechanism in practice. This suggests that something might be missing in
the textbook logic.
Indeed, a close look at the record of repeated failures in climate negotiations also
suggests that the addition of three specific ingredients might hinder the design of envi-
ronmental agreements. These ingredients are: heterogeneity, sovereignty and private
information. First, and this is certainly a standard feature of most public good prob-
lems, the costs and (under rare circumstances the possible) benefits of global warming
are unevenly distributed among countries. For some countries, decreasing emissions
will come with hindered growth, reallocation costs within and across sectors and much
internal political haggling. For others, implementation of restrictive policies may turn
out to be easier because of less powerful vested interests in national political arenas or,
taking an optimistic perspective, because it might open new growth opportunities (for
instance by means of innovation in green technologies).2 Heterogeneity matters.
Second, agreements are drafted in contexts surrounded by significant uncertainty.
Beyond the fundamental uncertainty that underlies the physical processes involved
in climate change and that affects equally all parties in their expectations about future
evolutions, another source of uncertainty lies in the mere heterogeneity we just pointed
out. Indeed, each participant to an agreement may retain private information on its
exact costs of decreasing pollution and improving environmental conditions. In such
contexts, countries might take advantages from others’ incomplete information and
exaggerate how costly they find to implement a given profile of emissions reductions.
Incentives matter.
Lastly, a key constraint on feasible agreements is that negotiating parties are sovereign
countries. This feature, which is certainly more specific to the provision of transna-
2Similarly, the costs associated to climate change may depend on the location of the countries. As
an example, the tribute paid by the Maldives and Switzerland following a one meter increase of the sea
level is hardly comparable
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tional public goods,3 has two immediate implications. Not only each country must find
it optimal to voluntary participate to an agreement but it is free to adopt a “business
as usual” (thereafter BAU ) route otherwise. To be accepted worldwide, an agreement
must yield to joining countries greater payoffs than these BAU options. Participation
matters.
Our Contribution. Taking heterogeneity, incentives and participation as key con-
straints on agreements, we discuss the performances of two institutions. The first
institution, which has received much attention in practice, is of course the market mech-
anism. Opening a market for pollution rights is indeed a natural solution to the multi-
lateral externalities problem in some contexts. Think for instance of a national govern-
ment willing to induce optimal abatements from polluting firms and standing ready
to make participation to such mechanism compulsory. Starting from an initial alloca-
tion of rights to emissions among firms, the market mechanism certainly reaches an
efficient allocation. Those firms ready to reduce emissions below their BAU levels sell
some rights while those eager to expand emissions buy those rights. This textbook so-
lution, although attractive as it looks, is unfortunately of little help and sometimes even
unfeasible in the contexts of international negotiations where voluntary participation
must be induced and private information is a concern. Of course, the price mechanism
may align the private incentives to reduce pollution with their socially optimal value.
Free riding in effort provision might be solved. However, private information makes
it also difficult and, let us insist, sometimes impossible, to find an initial allocation of
rights that cannot be contingent on countries’ private information and that would end
up being satisfactory for all of them. Indeed, consider the situation where all countries
are given the same initial rights. Then, countries which are efficient at reducing pollu-
tion will benefit from this system and may sell some rights while those countries with
higher costs of depollution might start with too few rights to find this market solution
attractive. They may just prefer to opt out the mechanism and free-ride on the joining
ones.
To solve this important trade-off between providing incentives to participants and pro-
viding incentives to participate, we propose an alternative simple mechanism. The key
additional ingredient that characterizes this mechanism is its ability to “screen” coun-
tries so that information on their preferences gets revealed through the negotiation
process. On top of inducing efforts towards depollution and generating participation,
this mechanism induces information revelation (even if it is in a rather coarse manner);
a third objective that the market mechanism does not necessarily achieve. In the tradi-
tion of the mechanism design literature, this proposal consists in a menu of two options
3See Sandler (1992) for some perspectives on the specificities of such transnational public goods and
Laffont and Martimort (2005) for a formal modeling.
3
among which countries are allowed to choose. The first “flat” option sees countries
keeping their emissions at their BAU level but also paying a fixed amount that goes
into a green fund. That contribution makes those countries indifferent between joining
in or breaking the whole agreement to reach payoffs at their BAU level. If a country
chooses instead the second ‘incentives” option, it must also contribute upfront to the
fund, but of course, and screening purposes, at a different level. On top, this coun-
try benefits also from a subsidy for each unit of effort. When the market mechanism
fails, the menu mechanism optimally balances the dual objectives of providing incen-
tives to participants and providing incentives to participate. Indeed, conditionally on the
participation of each country, it would be optimal to propose a large subsidy per unit
to induce the right actions - and solve the free-riding problem at the intensive margin.
However, this would require to ask participants to pay large up-front contributions
which deter participation of some less efficient countries. This would exacerbate the
free-riding problem at the extensive margin. As a consequence of this trade-off, the
optimal subsidy is reduced below the “market price.” The optimal menu mechanism
entails inefficient subsidies but facilitates participation.
A quick overview of the literature The literature on environmental agreements is
by now significantly broad. It has spanned a whole array of topics with some applied
papers discussing the properties of specific mechanisms which have some appeal from
an implementation viewpoint and more theoretical contributions using game theory
concepts to predict the outcomes of international negotiations in more abstract envi-
ronments. Given space constraints, this review will just address a few contributions
that are particularly meaningful to situate our own work.
As far as practical concerns are up, Bradford (2005) provides a very interesting pro-
posal to organize climate agreements, the so called “global public good purchase” (GPGP)
that can be viewed as an alternative to more traditional cap and trade systems. This
mechanism roughly consists in building a fund out of countries’ voluntary contribu-
tions and using this fund to reward efforts above the BAU trajectory. The interesting
aspect of this proposal is that once the system is set up, all countries are rewarded
though this fund for any abatement they do above the BAU level and so they all nec-
essarily gain from the mechanism once in place. The negative side of this GPGP ap-
proach is that it does not say much on how the cost of the mechanism is shared among
countries. Therefore, it leaves pending the free-riding problem on participation.
Inducing worldwide participation has precisely been the core of the theoretical
debate. A traditional approach to climate agreements (see Hardin and Baden, 1977)
would view climate as a standard public good where, as a result of a prisoner’s dilemma,
free riding cannot be avoided. A way out this negative result has been to suggest that
repeated relationships may enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes (see Cheikbossian
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and Sand-Zantman, 2011). This has led to the characterization of situations where all
countries decide to join the agreement by fear of future retaliation (see Barret, 1994, for
an in-depth discussion).
Taking into account the sovereign right for each country to enter (or not) into a
binding agreement and studying how their behavior depends on conjectures on oth-
ers’ retaliation if they don’t, Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) develop an alternative
approach showing that efficiency may be compatible with a worldwide coalition. Their
contribution shows that efficiency can be reached in a context of full information and
under well specified conjectures.4 Another alley for studying cooperation in the man-
agement of global public goods assumes that countries choose their abatement policies
after an initial stage -part of a metagame- where each country decides whether to play
cooperatively or not. Following this idea, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) study the prof-
itability and stability of partial international agreements in a framework where identi-
cal countries generate transboundaries emissions. They show that the commitment to
use a cooperative strategy is crucial to broaden participation.5
There are surprisingly very few papers considering asymmetric information on the
costs and benefits of mitigating climate change and almost no work addressing cli-
mate agreements taking a mechanism design perspective. Helm and Wirl (2011) is
one of the very few exceptions. The authors consider a two-country setting where
bargaining power is asymmetrically distributed and the uninformed country designs
a mechanism controlling collective emissions. They show that the uninformed party
must jointly use subsidies and his own emissions to incentivize the informed party
and ensure its participation. To address informational issues in the multi-agent con-
texts of environmental problems without assuming a priori a particular institution,
Baliga and Maskin (2003) have advocated the use of the mechanisms design tools. Al-
though their contribution stresses the role of free riding in effort provision, it remains
silent on free-riding problems in participation because they import the mechanism de-
sign methodology6 developed for standard public good problems without taking care
of the specific participation constraints that sovereignty imposes. This is the road we
follow in a companion paper (Martimort and Sand-Zantman, 2012). That paper char-
acterizes optimal mechanisms without making any restriction on the complexity of
menus. Doing so, we develop a more complete analysis of the trade-off between free
ridings on effort provision and on participation. We also compare the performances of
this optimal mechanism with a simple menu of options where the incentive options in-
4In particular, Chander and Tulkens obtain their efficiency result by imposing unanimous agreement
to join. We also consider this conjecture in the present paper, but in a setting of asymmetric information.
5Carraro (2005) discusses the influence of institutional rules (minimal participation rules, negotiation
linkage, regional versus global treaties) on the outcome of environmental negotiations and studies the
incentives to adopt those rules.
6See the seminal contributions by Laffont and Maskin (1982) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).
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duces first-best incentives. This comparison stresses the small welfare costs associated
with simplicity. The simple menu mechanism that we propose in the present paper
improves on the menu mechanism proposed in Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2012)
because we allow here to play on the slope of the incentive option. This extra degree
of freedom is important in view of trading on incentives and participation in the most
efficient way. The present paper differs also in stressing the performances of market
mechanisms under informational requirements.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 presents the model as well as two useful bench-
marks. Section 3 assesses the performances of a simple market mechanism and shows
its limits when participation is voluntary. Section 4 proposes an alternative menu
mechanism that reaches an optimal trade-off between the provision of incentives to par-
ticipants and the provision of incentives to participate. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are
relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model and Two Useful Benchmarks
Our objective is to study the feasibility of international agreements. To do so, we as-
sume that the world is populated by a continuum of countries of unit mass. Those
countries, if they want to mitigate their pollution emissions, can exert a specific effort.
More precisely, we assume that the effort ei exerted by country i yields both local ben-
efits of size αei (where α ∈ [0, 1)) and global benefits, worth (1 − α)ei, which accrue
worldwide. The parameter α represents the magnitude of the local consequences of ef-
forts in curbing pollution.7 An alternative and broader rationale is that implementing
a restrictive policy ei impacts negatively on local production and welfare so that the
local value of increasing effort is less than the social one.
To model heterogeneity, a key feature of our analysis, we assume that countries
differ by their marginal cost of exerting effort, namely C(ei, θi) =
e2i
2θi
, where θi is an
efficiency parameter. Those costs should be understood in a broad sense, including not
only technological costs but are also meant for opportunity costs (in terms of foregone
growth or in terms of internal political haggling).8 We thus write country i’s utility
function over payment-effort pairs (ti, ei) as:
Ui(ti, ei, E , θi) = ti + αei + (1− α)E − e
2
i
2θi
where E represents the “aggregate” effort taken worldwide.
7For instance, CO2 is known as having a global impact whereas other greenhouse gazes like SO2 or
NOx have also significant local impacts.
8With the latter interpretation, it is not clear whether developed or developing countries are the ones
with the smallest abatement costs.
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Country i has private information on its efficiency parameter θi while its effort in
mitigating pollution is observable. As the θi’s are not only technological but also repre-
sent opportunity costs, assuming private information is certainly reasonable. Similarly,
the assumption that effort is observable, contrary to other public good issues, fits the
current situation where new technologies (by means of satellite observations) allow a
very precise control of the behavior of each pollution unit.
Efficiency parameters θi are independently drawn from the same cumulative distri-
bution F (·) with support Θ = [θ, θ] (with θ > 0) and an everywhere positive and atom-
less density f(θ) = F ′(θ). Let denote by Eθ(·) the expectation operator with respect
to θ. For technical reasons, we also assume that the following monotonicity condition
holds:
d
dθ
(
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
)
≤ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ. (1)
Benchmarks. Two natural benchmarks are interesting to look at: the first best allo-
cation and the BAU scenario where no agreement is signed. To look at the first case,
observe that worldwide welfare can be expressed as:
W =
∫
i
Uidi =
∫
i
(
ti + αei + (1− α)E − e
2
i
2θi
)
di.
Using the budget balance condition,
∫
i
tidi = 0, leads to
W =
∫
i
(
ei − e
2
i
2θi
)
di ≡
∫
Θ
(
e(θ)− e(θ)
2
2θ
)
f(θ)dθ.
At the first best, worldwide welfare is maximized for the following effort profile
eFB(θ) = θ ∀θ ∈ Θ
and its level is thus simply
W∗ = Eθ˜(θ˜)
2
. (2)
Let us turn now to the BAU scenario. Now, countries do not internalize the impact
of their own effort on overall welfare, and efforts are too low. More precisely, the
corresponding effort of a country with type θ is:
eN(θ) = arg max
e
αe− e
2
2θ
+ (1− α)Eθ˜(eN(θ˜)) = αθ ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Individual payoffs are then given by:
UN(θ) =
α2
2
θ + (1− α)αEθ˜(θ˜).
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Social welfare becomes
WN = Eθ˜(θ˜)
2
α(2− α) <W∗. (3)
It is easy to see here that the gap between the BAU effort and the first-best level is
naturally decreasing in α, and the same is true when looking at welfare levels. Indeed,
the more local are the consequences of environmental policy, the smaller is the free-
riding problem in exerting effort. Nevertheless, we will show next that the inefficiency
of market mechanisms arises only when α is not too small.9
3 An Impossibility Result and the Inefficiency of the Mar-
ket Mechanism
In this Section, we assess the performances of a simple market mechanism that allows
countries to trade their abatement duties, or equivalently their rights for emissions.
In the asymmetric information context that we consider, those performances must be
assessed not only in terms of their incentive properties but also with an eye on whether
this mechanism generates enough participation.
In this set-up, an initial allocation of those rights is chosen at the outset and each
country is first endowed with some initial duties to fulfill. For simplicity and although
the results below would hold with more generality,10 we assume that duties are dis-
tributed uniformly. Let denote by E0 this common value applying to all countries
worldwide. Starting from that initial allocation, countries can trade those rights on a
worldwide market. We denote by p the market price.
A country with type θ wants to trade rights so as to maximize the following expres-
sion:
U0(θ, p, E0) = max
e
αe+ p(e− E0) + (1− α)E0 − e
2
2θ
, (4)
where E0 = Eθ˜(e(θ˜)) denotes the overall level of abatements worldwide and e(θ˜) is the
equilibrium level of effort exerted by a country with type θ under this market scenario.
The maximization of the above objective immediately yields the following expression
of the “gross demand function” for rights:
e(θ, p) = (α + p)θ. (5)
9At the extreme, α = 1 would nevertheless correspond to a degenerate case were BAU is efficient.
10The reader accustomed with the mechanism design literature already knows from the work of
Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) that efficiency can be achieved under asymmetric information
in many contexts provided that the status quo payoff stipulates rights which are not too asymmetric.
Although this latter paper was developed in the context of a partnership to divide a tradable good, its
insights are quite general.
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The market clearing condition finally gives the expression of the prevailing price p0:
Eθ˜(e(θ˜, p0)) = E0 ⇔ p0 =
E0
Eθ˜(θ˜)
− α. (6)
Through this market mechanism, a country with type θ ends up exerting an equilib-
rium effort worth:
e(θ, p0) =
E0
Eθ˜(θ˜)
θ. (7)
The market mechanism is thus an efficient way of inducing efforts if the uniform level
of duties that applies worldwide is efficient “on average”:
E0 = Eθ˜(θ˜). (8)
The prevailing market price is thus such that each extra unit of abatements beyond the
initial allocation is paid at its social value:
p0 = 1− α. (9)
So doing, each country internalizes the impact of its own choice of effort on aggregate
welfare and has the right marginal incentives to exert effort:
e(θ, p0) ≡ eFB(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
The remaining question is whether this market mechanism induces participation
of all sovereign countries. Of course, checking that participation condition requires to
compute the fall-back payoffs of countries that decide not to join the agreement. These
payoffs in turn depend on the various conjectures that this country will entertain on
the behavior of the ratifying ones. This issue is in fact a difficult one that we study at
more length in Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2012). For the purpose of this paper, we
follow Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) and assume that the approval of all countries
is necessary to implement the market solution. Otherwise, the BAU scenario prevails
worldwide.
In this context, inducing participation requires thus to satisfy:
U0(θ, p0, E0) ≥ UN(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ. (10)
Elaborating on this condition yields the following result:
Proposition 1 The market mechanism cannot be efficient and induce voluntary participation
worldwide when:
α > α1 =
θ
2Eθ˜(θ˜)− θ
∈ (0, 1). (11)
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Condition (11) certainly holds when the parameter α is close enough to one (the
case of a weak externality) or when heterogeneity on the productivity type θ is large
enough so that Eθ˜(θ˜) is sufficiently above θ. In the case of global warming, this is of
course this second interpretation that we will favor.
To understand this result, one must figure out the impact that choosing a uniform
allocation of rights E0 = Eθ˜(θ˜) has both on incentives to exert effort and on incentives
to participate. From the market-clearing condition (6), this choice certainly induces the
“right” market price, i.e., an implicit subsidy per unit of abatement which is Pigovian.
All countries have the “right” incentives to exert effort. In the vocabulary coined in
Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2012), the market mechanism induces no free-riding at
the intensive margin.
Of course, the drawback of such a choice is that the market mechanism forces the
less efficient countries (especially, those with types θ less than Eθ˜(θ˜)) to start buying
rights to abate less than their required duties. This is very costly and make their fall-
back option much more attractive. Free-riding at the extensive margin becomes now the
main concern and the market mechanism is ill equipped to address this issue.
A possible way out this trade-off could simply be to impose lower duties on inef-
ficient countries at the outset. This would certainly relax free riding at the extensive
margin. However, asymmetric information makes it impossible to make such type-
dependent allocation of rights.
Of course, when trading off those costs and benefits of an initial allocation of rights
which is “on average” efficient, one has to keep in mind that both the incentives and
the participation effects depend in a non-trivial way on the size of the externality α.
When α is small, positive externalities are significant and the fall-back option yields
low payoffs. Participation constraints are a priori relaxed by this first effect that bites
on the right-hand side of (10). On the other hand, and from an incentives viewpoint,
countries do not care much about the local impact of their effort. To induce effort, the
market price must be very large which means that inefficient types must pay a lot to
abate less than their duties. This second-effect reduces the left-hand side of (10) which
makes participation much harder. Condition (11) shows that α must be low enough to
ensure that the first effect dominates.
Alternative implementation. When the market mechanism is efficient and induces
worldwide participation, an alternative implementation of the final outcome would
be for all countries to agree on a per unit subsidy for abatements cum a fixed contri-
bution to a fund. Indeed, the countries’ payoffs and their behavior are the same than
in the market mechanism when facing the Pigovian subsidy p0 = 1 − α and the fixed
contribution T0 such that:
T0 = p0E0 = (1− α)Eθ˜(θ˜). (12)
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Observe that this scheme is obviously budget balanced.
In the remainder of the paper, we will favor this more “centralized” approach in
circumstances where efficiency is no longer feasible. We will bear a particular attention
on how such centralized mechanisms must be modified in a second-best environment.
Remark 1 Proposition 1 certainly casts also some doubts on the efficiency of a market for car-
bon if initial allocations are allocated by grand-fathering (i.e., as functions of past realizations
that may be only partially correlated with future opportunity costs and thus “uniform” in a
certain sense). An alternative interpretation of our findings is thus that the proposal to estab-
lish such market can never find support from all countries, especially those with the highest
opportunity costs of abatements. Advocates of such market solution should certainly re-assess
its virtues in view of the fundamental impossibility result presented in Proposition 1.
4 Ensuring Voluntary Participation and Incentives with
a Simple Menu
The previous Section has left us with a pessimistic view of what can be achieved with a
worldwide market unless gains from cooperation are sufficiently sizable to overcome
informational constraints. The key difficulty with a simple market mechanism is that
the least efficient countries may want to stay out of the agreement rather than being
imposed duties which are certainly too costly for them. Second-best mechanisms must
be constructed to address this participation problem.
To do so, we propose a simple menu with two options. Those options allow self-
selection of the different countries according to their opportunity costs of effort. Roughly
speaking each of those options responds to the specific problem raised by one kind of
the free-riding problems. The first option consists of a fixed contribution T¯ and sub-
sidy p per unit of abatement. This incentive option is targeted to the countries which
are the most able to exert effort. With that option, those efficient countries have incen-
tives to expand effort beyond the BAU level and free riding at the intensive margin
diminishes for those types. The second option only entails a fixed contribution T . In-
efficient countries opt for that scheme which is designed to induce their participation
to the mechanism. Free riding at the extensive margin is fought with that option.
Countries are now sorted according to their efficiency parameter θ. The most ineffi-
cient ones, with types on an interval [θ, θ∗] (thus a fraction F (θ∗)) opt for the fixed con-
tribution. A contrario, the most efficient countries whose types belong to [θ∗, θ] choose
the incentive option. With such menu, all countries ratify the mechanism. If any coun-
try refuses to do so, we assume as before that the whole agreement breaks down with
the BAU ’s payoffs being again the fall-back options.
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By adopting the “incentive option” (T¯ , p), a country with type θ reaches a payoff
worth (where we make explicit its dependence on the mechanism):
U1(θ, p, T¯ ) = max
e
(α + p)e− e
2
2θ
+ (1− α)E1 − T¯ (13)
where E1 whose expression will be clarified below is the expected effort worldwide
under this scenario. Of course, maximizing the above objective immediately yields an
effort supply which is still given by (3).
When opting for the fixed contribution, a country with type θ still exert its BAU ef-
fort level, namely eN(θ). Such country benefits however from the greater effort exerted
by more efficient ones. This is reflected in its payoff which is now given by:
U1(θ, T ) = max
e
αe− e
2
2θ
+ (1− α)E1 − T . (14)
Taking into account that only a mass F (θ∗) of countries still exert their BAU effort
eN(θ) while a mass 1 − F (θ∗) expands effort beyond this BAU level, we immediately
find that the worldwide effort is worth:
E1 =
∫ θ∗
θ
eN(θ)f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θ∗
e(θ, p)f(θ)dθ > EN =
∫ θ
θ
eN(θ)f(θ)dθ. (15)
Equipped with this specification, we can write down the conditions that the mech-
anism (T , T¯ , p) must satisfy.
• Incentive compatibility. The cut-off type θ∗ must be indifferent between the two
options proposed:
U1(θ
∗, p, T¯ ) = U1(θ∗, T ). (16)
• Budget balance. The overall fixed contributions contribute to a fund that is used to
give subsidies under the incentive option. This budget balance condition can be
written as:
F (θ∗)T + (1− F (θ∗))T¯ = p
∫ θ
θ∗
e(θ, p)f(θ)dθ. (17)
• Participation. Insuring participation by the least efficient countries is obtained by
making their fixed contribution “pay for the positive externality” exerted by most
efficient ones when expanding their effort beyond the BAU level. This immedi-
ately gives the following condition:
T = (1− α)
∫ θ
θ∗
(e(θ, p)− eN(θ))f(θ)dθ. (18)
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The general analysis that we develop in Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2012) shows
that those three properties apply to more general (nonlinear) mechanisms. Yet, those
simple menus with two options already highlight some important economic proper-
ties.
Proposition 2 Suppose that conditions (1) and (11) both hold. The optimal menu (T 1, T¯1, p1)
has the following properties.
• The subsidy in the incentive option is lower than the Pigovian level:
p1 < p0 = 1− α. (19)
• Not all countries always opt for this incentive option. Indeed, we have:
θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ) (20)
when
1 ≥ α ≥ Eθ˜(θ˜)
θ
α1. (21)
In a second-best environment, i.e., under the condition of Proposition 2 that pre-
vents efficiency and full participation if the market mechanism prevails, the trade-off
between the two free-riding problems at the extensive and at intensive margin is solved
by giving up a bit of efficiency. This implies that the most efficient countries will re-
ceive a reduced subsidy and won’t fully internalize the impact of their effort choice on
worldwide welfare. Reducing this subsidy facilitates participation to the agreement by
the least efficient countries. Indeed, those countries ratify the mechanism because they
are just indifferent between joining in or not. They are ready to pay the positive ex-
ternality that the most efficient ones bring with their increased effort beyond the BAU
level. With an incentive option that becomes less powerful, less subsidies have to be
paid and fixed contributions to the fund diminish which helps to solve free riding at
the extensive margin.
When the tension between those two free-riding problems is strong (i.e., when (21)
which is a strengthened version of (11) holds), each option within the menu attracts a
positive measure of countries. Instead, when the tension is less pronounced, all coun-
tries choose the incentive option. Still, the subsidy remains lower than its Pigovian
level.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the search for policies that could efficiently mitigate global warming, much empha-
sis has recently been put on the use of market mechanisms. The source of such interest
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should certainly be found in the optimistic view expressed by practitioners and schol-
ars that the successes of cap and trade systems that were experienced in several regions
of the world could carry over at a worldwide level. This paper casts some doubt on
such optimistic stance. Market mechanisms may fail in getting to an efficient alloca-
tion of effort worldwide when participants are quite heterogenous and their voluntary
participation must be induced. Market mechanisms certainly improve the free-riding
problem in effort provision but may fail to induce participation. For worldwide agree-
ments, nations are sovereign parties at the negotiation table; they cannot be viewed as
firms subject to compulsory regulations in a domestic context. Because of this striking
difference, the possible failure of markets should receive more consideration in po-
litical debates. Economists and practitioners should take with a word of caution the
success of instruments and regulations developed in national arenas when it comes to
broaden their scope to an international setting.
This paper takes seriously this unavoidable trade-off between incentives and partic-
ipation. Yet, we have demonstrated that a simple menu mechanism with two options
can reach unanimous participation and provide “almost” right incentives. With the
first option, countries keep their emissions at their BAU level but contribute to a fund.
With the second one, countries not only contribute to this fund but also benefit from
the subsidies linked to the level of abatements they choose.
The approach we developed above might be criticized for being excessively static.
As such, our model is necessarily silent on the relationship between what should be
the current allocation of rights in a market solution and the past behaviors of countries.
Although tailoring the level of permits left to a country to its past emissions may be
attractive, especially for screening purposes, it might also introduce the possibility of
gaming and, beyond, open the door to much politicking in deciding upon reference
points. Second, the absence of dynamics renders our simple model of little value to
account for issues of ethics and horizontal fairness among countries with different de-
grees of development that decisions on such allocation of initial rights may encounter.
These are important questions that would deserve further works.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Condition (10) amounts to:
1− α2
2
θ ≥ α(1− α)Eθ˜(θ˜) ∀θ.
Taking θ = θ and taking into account that α < 1 yields (11).
Proof of Proposition 2. Altogether (16), (17) and (18) define three equations with
(T , T¯ , p) and the cut-off θ∗ as the unknowns. After some simplifications using (3), (16),
(17) and (18) yield respectively:
θ∗p(p+ 2α) = 2(T¯ − T ), (A1)
TF (θ∗) + T¯ (1− F (θ∗)) = (α + p)p
∫ θ¯
θ∗
θf(θ)dθ, (A2)
and
T = (1− α)p
∫ θ¯
θ∗
θf(θ)dθ. (A3)
Combining the above conditions leads to the following expression of the cut-off θ∗ as
a function of p only:
θ∗(p)(1− F (θ∗(p)))∫ θ¯
θ∗(p) θf(θ)dθ
=
θ∗(p)
Eθ˜(θ˜|θ˜ ≥ θ∗(p))
= 2
(
1− 1
p+ 2α
)
. (A4)
Let us now study the properties of θ∗(p). Before then, we prove the following Lemma.
Lemma A.1
d
dθ
(
θ
Eθ˜(θ˜|θ˜ ≥ θ)
)
> 0. (A5)
Proof. Differentiating, we get:
d
dθ
(
θ
Eθ˜(θ˜|θ˜ ≥ θ)
)
=
(1− F (θ)− θf(θ)) ∫ θ
θ
xf(x)dx+ θ2(1− F (θ))f(θ)(∫ θ
θ
xf(x)dx
)2 .
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Observe that the numerator on the right-hand side has the same sign as:
Ψ(θ) =
(
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
− 1
)∫ θ
θ
xf(x)dx+ θ(1− F (θ)).
We have also Ψ(θ) = 0 and, from Assumption 1,
Ψ˙(θ) =
d
dθ
(
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
)∫ θ
θ
xf(x)dx < 0.
Therefore, we get Ψ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ (withe quality only at θ). Hence, (A5) hold.
From Lemma A.1, we get:
θ˙∗(p) =
2
(p+ 2α)2 d
dθ
(
θ
Eθ˜(θ˜|θ˜≥θ)
)
|θ=θ∗(p)
> 0.
Hence, (A4) uniquely defines θ∗(p) which is interior when p is in the range defined by
the next two inequalities:
θ
Eθ˜(θ˜)
≤ 2
(
1− 1
p+ 2α
)
≤ 1
⇔ 2
(
Eθ˜(θ˜)
θ
α1 − 1
)
= p ≤ p ≤ p = 2(1− α). (A6)
Let us now define worldwide welfare as:
W(p) =
∫ θ∗(p)
θ
(
eN(θ)− e
2
N(θ)
2θ
)
f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θ∗(p)
(
e(θ˜, p)− e(θ˜, p)
2
2θ˜
)
f(θ)dθ,
or, using (3), as
W(p) =
(
α− α
2
2
)∫ θ∗(p)
θ
θf(θ)dθ +
(
α + p− (α + p)
2
2
)∫ θ
θ∗(p)
θf(θ)dθ. (A7)
Differentiating with respect to p yields:
W ′(p) = (1− α− p)
∫ θ¯
θ∗(p)
θf(θ)dθ − θ˙∗(p)θ∗(p)f(θ∗(p))p
(
1− α− p
2
)
.
We evaluate this derivative at p0 = 1− α. First, observe that
θ
Eθ˜(θ˜)
<
θ∗(p0)
Eθ˜(θ˜|θ˜ ≥ θ∗(p0))
=
2α
1 + α
< 1
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where the left-hand side inequality follows from (11) and the right-hand side inequality
from α < 1. From Lemma A.1, we thus get θ < θ∗(p0) < θ¯. Therefore, we find:
W ′(p0) = −θ˙∗(p0)θ∗(p0)f(θ∗(p0))(1− α)
2
2
< 0. (A8)
From this, (19) immediately follows since θ˙∗(p) > 0 for all p.
Tedious computations yield also:
W ′(p) = Eθ˜(θ˜)(α− α1)−
(2Eθ˜(θ˜)− θ)
Ψ(θ)
θ(Eθ˜(θ˜)− θ)
(
Eθ˜(θ˜)
θ)
α1 − α
)
and
W ′(p) > 0 (A9)
when (21) holds.
From (A8) and (A9), it follows that the optimal price p1 satisfies:
p < p1 < p0.
Finally, (20) follows because θ˙∗(p) > 0 for all p.
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